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Shanghai as an International Financial Center 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In 1949 Shanghai was the leading international financial centre (IFC) in Asia. 
Recently the push of Shanghai to regain its long lost status of a regional IFC has 
begun to attract widespread interest. This paper first draws upon the IFC literature to 
derive the factors that are considered to be important in determining the potential of a 
city to emerge as an IFC. Shanghai’s progress is then measured against these criteria 
and is also placed in a comparative perspective by measuring against Hong Kong and 
Singapore. The findings relating to Shanghai’s strengths and weaknesses, along with 
implications for Hong Kong and Singapore, are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1949 Shanghai was the leading financial centre in Asia. The Banker (March 2003) 
magazine recounts that at this time there were 24 state banks, over 200 private 
lenders, trust companies and other financial institutions based in Shanghai. It also 
hosted the world’s third largest stock market, following only New York and London. 
Now, over 50 years on and more than 20 years after China began its open door policy, 
Shanghai is once again seeking to transform itself into an international financial 
centre (IFC). In doing so it is attempting to make up the ground lost to neighbouring 
Tokyo, Hong Kong, SAR (hereafter abbreviated as “Hong Kong”) and Singapore. 
According to Shanghai’s mayor the goal is to reach IFC status within 10 to 20 years 
(People's Daily 08/08/2002).  
 
Financial sector development in Shanghai has been rapid over the past decade. 
According to Wong (2002) financial services accounted for 15.2% of Shanghai’s 
GDP in 2000. Shanghai has already established itself as the domestic financial hub of 
mainland China. The municipality’s stock market has developed rapidly since 1991 to 
become the third largest in Asia, following only Tokyo and Hong Kong (People's 
Daily 06/08/2002). Shanghai has also become the centre for many of the country’s 
other financial activities, including interbank lending, bond trading, foreign exchange 
trading and fledgling futures and commodity trading. It is also becoming increasingly 
clear that Shanghai is serving as the point of contact for China’s international 
financial integration at the expense of Shenzhen or even Hong Kong. Foreign banks in 
Shanghai now account for half of the deposits, loans and assets of all foreign banks in 
China (People's Daily 06/08/2002). The major foreign banks in China including Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), Citibank and Standard Chartered 
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have all moved their China headquarters to Shanghai since the mid-1990s. HSBC has 
gone one step further and made Shanghai its regional headquarters.  Shanghai has also 
traditionally been used as the testing ground for China’s external financial 
liberalisation policy. For example, in December 1996, foreign banks located in 
Shanghai were amongst the first to be permitted to engage in local renminbi (RMB)-
denominated financial services and now the majority of foreign banks licensed to 
trade in RMB are located in Shanghai.1  
 
While Shanghai’s drive to IFC status has been a hot topic in the financial press, little 
has been done by way of a systematic attempt to gauge its progress using a conceptual 
framework grounded in the IFC literature. In contrast, other Asian IFCs such as 
Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore have all been the subject of previous, often 
comparative, research (e.g. see Yong et al. 1999; Sassen 2001). Investigating 
Shanghai’s progress towards achieving IFC status is important for several reasons. 
Firstly, the pace of China’s international financial integration is now increasingly 
being pushed through external bodies such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
For example, in a radical change from historical policy, five years after China’s WTO 
entry in 2001, all foreign banks throughout China will be afforded full national 
treatment (Lardy 2002, p.79). Given that Shanghai will be the initial contact point and 
hub of China’s external financial liberalisation, the degree to which it can successfully 
transform itself into an IFC will go a long way to determining whether China’s global 
integration proceeds smoothly. Secondly, if Shanghai can transform itself into a 
successful IFC, this could have significant economic implications not only for China 
                                                 
1 Alluding to Shanghai’s current dominance is not intended to downplay the highly dynamic state of 
China’s financial markets and the possibility that another mainland city may one day supersede 
Shanghai. Zhao, et al. (2002), for example, contends that Beijing has better long run potential as an 
IFC due to its geographical proximity to key central government decision making bodies. Shenzhen is 
also actively competing with Shanghai to be the mainland’s financial hub (People's Daily 18/03/2003). 
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but also for its regional competitors such as Hong Kong and Singapore. The fact that 
an IFC can potentially bring economic benefits to a host economy has been well 
discussed in the literature (Kaufman 2001: 366).  
 
This paper analyses Shanghai’s progress in the following manner. Section 2 lays out 
the conceptual framework for the analysis by highlighting those factors that are 
regarded as being the driving forces behind IFC development. Section 3 then 
compares the current state of play in Shanghai against these criteria. Conditions in 
Shanghai are also contrasted wherever possible with those in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. This is done primarily because Hong Kong and Singapore are already 
regarded as having attained IFC status and hence much can be learned about 
Shanghai’s current situation by placing it in a comparative context. In addition, Hong 
Kong and Singapore are the two regional IFCs that will most directly face competitive 
pressure from Shanghai’s emergence. Therefore, gauging their current degree of 
superiority will have implications for the time frame in which their ascendency may 
begin to be questioned. In order to make the commentary in section 3 tractable, 
summary data measures are used wherever possible. Section 4 summarises the 
findings and implications. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
A financial centre is an area, normally a city or even a spot within a city’s boundaries, 
in which a vast amount of financial activities are concentrated. O’Brian (1992, p.73) 
puts it eloquently in stating that “finance is like the Olympic Games…it tends to be 
the city not the nation that competes for the activity”. As noted prominently in the 
economic geography literature, the formation of financial centres is powerfully 
shaped by the forces of agglomeration and is thus path dependent. Nevertheless, 
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history demonstrates that established IFCs are not immune to decline due to 
competition from new challengers. Examples include Sydney surpassing Melbourne, 
Toronto surpassing Montreal, Johannesburg surpassing Cape Town, and Sao Paulo 
surpassing Rio de Janeiro during the post war period (Porteous 1995). Such a shift of 
comparative advantage between competing cities should not come as a surprise 
considering that financial production is increasingly footloose thanks to the 
advancement of information and telecommunication technology. Such technological 
advances, when combined with global deregulation of financial industries, have 
prompted some to cast doubts on the need for the centralisation of financial activities 
and, thus, on the future of IFCs (e.g. see O'Brien 1992). However, others counter that 
location still matters (e.g. see Sassen 1999; Tschoegl 2000) and there has certainly 
been no observable decline in their prominence. If anything, the race amongst cities to 
establish themselves as IFCs has intensified (The Economist 09/05/1998). 
 
Montes (1999) classifies financial markets according the type of intermediation they 
perform (Table 1). Type 1 is considered the least sophisticated. For a given financial 
market to be considered an IFC, it must at least display some features relating to 
Types 2 - 4. According to this classification, despite Shanghai’s financial market 
being the most dynamic one on the mainland, it is still predominantly a Type 1 market 
and it’s IFC drive must therefore largely be discussed in terms of potential rather than 
achievements to date. This is exemplified by the fact that foreign intermediaries 
continue to play only a marginal role in Shanghai’s financial sector. For example, at 
year-end 2002 outstanding loans in domestic and foreign currencies at both Chinese 
and foreign financial institutions in Shanghai amounted to USD127.12 billion 
(People's Daily 10/01/2003). However, as of November 2002, total loans from foreign 
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financial institutions amounted to only USD9.5 billion and the bulk of this business 
was denominated in foreign currencies (People's Daily 03/01/2003). Beijing’s 
ongoing reluctance to make the RMB convertible for capital account transactions also 
necessarily constrains the ability of Shanghai to achieve higher degrees of financial 
sophistication.  
Table 1 
The centrifugal forces usually taken to be relevant for IFC formation are a mix of 
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, in conjunction with the efficiency of the 
financial sector itself. These factors are summarised in Table 2. In terms of 
macroeconomic conditions, the income level and growth rate are important to the 
formation of an IFC in several aspects. Firstly, an IFC is typically founded on the 
basis of a vibrant domestic financial market.2 The domestic demand for sophisticated 
financial products and services is closely related to domestic savings per capita and, 
hence, GDP per capita. Secondly, the larger an economy is, the more investment 
opportunities it affords to foreign investors. Related to this point is that the GDP 
growth rate not only reflects the short-term dynamism of an economy but also 
determines the long-term income level. Therefore, an economy with a higher growth 
rate, other things equal, will be more attractive to foreign investors. Other important 
macroeconomic factors include the international trade and investment intensity of a 
city. A city is more likely to emerge as an IFC when the real sector is both dynamic 
and internationally orientated. An IFC is essentially an exporter of financial and 
related services. Trade in merchandise goods and direct investment activities make 
use of these services also. In particular, exports and imports provide opportunities for 
the financial sector to underwrite trade through the provision of credit, and, if 
                                                 
2 An exception is those IFCs that attract international capital mainly by serving as a tax and regulation 
haven. Most of these IFCs are island states with virtually no other industries. 
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domestic firms expand into other countries via foreign direct investment, then 
financiers can follow firms with the provision of financial products services (Meyer 
1998). This provides a foundation for the agglomeration of financial, accounting, 
legal or other related services in the economy. The importance of maintaining sound 
macroeconomic policies to promote an IFCs development is self-explanatory. 
Assuming that macroeconomic factors are sufficiently satisfied, the various 
microeconomic considerations listed in Table 2 then become important.3 All of these 
microeconomic factors influence the opportunity cost of doing business in one city 
versus another. A lack of political and economic freedom can be particularly 
problematic given that the free flow of information (collection, generation and 
distribution) is both a key input and output for an IFC. At the most basic level, the 
driving force underlying the formation of financial markets and institutions is an 
intention to reduce the costs of acquiring information and undertaking transactions 
(Levine 1997, p.690). Therefore, if a financial sector does not perform this task 
efficiently, there is little reason to expect that it will flourish.   
Table 2 
 
3. Shanghai’s Development as an IFC 
This section reviews Shanghai’s development as an IFC according to the conceptual 
framework presented in Table 2. Having noted the importance of a vibrant and 
internationally orientated business sector in the conceptual discussion above, by way 
of a general empirical introduction it is useful to consider the degree of success 
Shanghai has had with respect to attracting the resources of foreign multinational 
companies (MNCs). This is because in making its investment and locational 
decisions, an MNC is effectively required to make an overall judgement regarding 
                                                 
3 While the relative importance of each factor listed in Table 2 is still not well understood, the 
interested reader may like to consult Bindemann (1999) who has attempted to shed some light on this 
issue using survey methods. 
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many of the factors listed in Table 2. When the revealed preferences of MNCs are 
examined, two important points emerge. Firstly, the economic attractiveness of 
Shanghai has improved markedly over time. For example, Table 3, column 1 presents 
the level of FDI in Shanghai in level form and as a percentage of the national total in 
parentheses. Column 2 shows the number of registered firms with foreign capital in 
Shanghai, again with the percentage of the national total in parentheses. It is clear that 
since the early 1990s Shanghai has not only passively benefited from China’s overall 
rising prominence as an FDI host but has actively began capturing a larger share of 
the national total. Secondly, despite this rapid growth, Shanghai still trails Hong Kong 
and Singapore by a large margin, particularly in terms of attracting key decision-
making and high value-added units of MNCs such as regional headquarters. For 
example, a two-year long study published in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
publication Business Asia (11/12/2000) surveyed over 8000 North American, 
European and Japanese firms in the region and found that 35 per cent of companies 
based their regional headquarters in Hong Kong, followed closely by 30 per cent in 
Singapore. Shanghai remained a distant competitor with only 3 per cent.  According 
to a recent report, in 2002 there were 948 foreign companies that had set up their 
regional headquarters in Hong Kong (Hong Kong Government 2002). This compared 
with just 79 in Shanghai (SinoCast China Business Daily News 28/03/2003). While 
Shanghai’s share of regional headquarters remains small, it should be noted that in the 
period immediately prior to and since WTO entry, a growing band of MNCs have 
moved all or part of their regional headquarters to Shanghai, and in most cases these 
business units were transferred from Hong Kong or Singapore. These include well-
known Fortune 500 companies such as Alcatel, Allied Signal, CitiBank, General 
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Motors, Johnson & Johnson, Kodak, Roche, Rhodia Chemicals, Sharpe, HSBC, UPS, 
Standard Chartered, Mckinsey and Honeywell.  
Table 3 
 
3.1 Macroeconomic environment  
     3.1.1 Income level and growth 
Table 4 summarises the real rate of GDP growth and per capita GDP for Shanghai, 
Hong Kong and Singapore in the last two years. If it is supposed that the three 
economies maintain their growth rates in 2002 unchanged, that is, Shanghai will 
continue to grow over 4 times as fast as Hong Kong and Singapore do, it will still take 
Shanghai 20 years to catch up in terms of per capita GDP. This simple calculation 
indicates that, as far as the income level is concerned, Hong Kong and Singapore have 
at least 10 to 15 years’ time to prepare themselves for the challenge of Shanghai. 
Table 4 
 
The above calculation is also likely to overestimate the growth advantage of Shanghai 
compared with Hong Kong and Singapore. This is primarily because Shanghai can 
grow quickly for a time as it catches up with the richer economies. The Growth 
Competitiveness Index compiled annually by the World Economic Forum is 
instructive here even though it only compares countries rather than cities. This index 
aims to measure the capacity of the national economy to achieve sustainable 
economic growth over the medium term, controlling for the current level of 
development and short run business cycle fluctuations (Cornelius et al. 2003: 8). Such 
adjustments have a considerable impact on China as although it had the highest 
growth rate amongst the 80 surveyed economies in 2002, it’s overall ranking was 33rd, 
compared with Hong Kong which ranked 17th and Singapore which ranked 4th.  
Table 5 
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     3.1.2 Trade and investment intensity 
Table 5 show the 3-year average ratios of imports to GDP, exports to GDP and total 
trade to GDP over the period of 1994-2002. We divide the period of 1994 to 2002 into 
three sub-periods, corresponding to before, during, and after the Asian crisis. It can be 
seen that during the Asian crisis trade intensities for all three economies fell but the 
fall for Shanghai was only marginal. By 2000-2002, Hong Kong and Singapore had 
resumed their pre-crisis trade intensities, whereas Shanghai had progressed to raising 
its trade intensity by around one third. Shanghai’s trade intensity in this comparative 
perspective is particularly impressive given that Hong Kong and Singapore, being 
small island cities, would expectedly have a higher trade dependency than Shanghai, 
which is geographically part of a larger and more resource abundant domestic 
economy.  
 
Table 6 shows the annual average value of FDI inflows and outflows as a proportion 
of GDP for the three economies over the period of 1990-2002. This period is divided 
into three sub-periods: 1990-95, 1996-98 and 1999-2002. Shanghai’s openness in 
terms of hosting FDI inflows appears to compare well with both Hong Kong and 
Singapore and has consistently averaged above 10% of GDP.4 Unfortunately, data 
regarding outward FDI from Shanghai are not available although such capital 
outflows are expected to be small when compared to Hong Kong and Singapore.  
                                                 
4 The 1999-2002 FDI figures for Hong Kong are much larger than during previous periods and this is 
due to a noticeable jump in FDI inflows and outflows during 2000. We suspect a lot of these capital 
inflows make use of Hong Kong as a detour towards mainland China and that is why capital outflows 
were equally large in magnitude. 
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Table 6 
     3.1.3 Sound macroeconomic policy 
There are two major hurdles in comparing economic policy between the three cities. 
Firstly, as far as macroeconomic policies are concerned, such as the money supply 
and the exchange rate, Shanghai is part of mainland China and hence has no 
independent macroeconomic policy to speak of. As a consequence, we can only look 
at the macroeconomic policy of China as a whole. Secondly, since there is a wide 
range of macroeconomic policies that could affect business operations, a summary 
measure is needed in order to undertake a tractable commentary. To achieve this aim, 
we make use of the Macroeconomic Environment Index compiled by the World 
Economic Forum. It is necessary to emphasise first that this index and its composite 
subindexes not only measure macroeconomic policies, but also a country’s 
performance in a number of related aspects, such as its credit rating. In other words, 
the index measures both the “input” and “output” of macroeconomic policies. Table 7 
summarises the ranking of China, Hong Kong and Singapore over the past two years. 
In terms of the Macroeconomic Environment Index, China ranks 8th in 2002 while 
Hong Kong ranks 3rd and Singapore tops the list. Perhaps the most important 
observation flowing from these figures is not that Singapore and Hong Kong are high 
on the list, but the fact that China has been within the top 10 countries over the past 
two years. In fact, China ranks even higher than Hong Kong in terms of 
macroeconomic stability in 2002. What drags China’s overall ranking down is its 
credit rating, which highlights the continuing uncertainty residing in its economy. A 
caveat here is that the above index was first constructed in 2001. However, a 
country’s ranking can be greatly affected by short-term fluctuations in its 
macroeconomic conditions. This is reflected in the large change of ranking in the 
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Government Expenditure Subindex over the two years for all of the three economies, 
as well as that of the Macroeconomic Stability Subindex for China and Hong Kong. 
Table 7 
3.2 Microeconomic business environment 
Comparable city-level microeconomic data relating to the various criteria listed in 
Table 2 are both limited and potentially cumbersome. Thus, in this section we 
predominantly make use of summary measures. One important source with relevance 
to the present study is a survey conducted in 1998 by Enright and Thompson from the 
University of Hong Kong. It asked MNCs to rank the attractiveness of Shanghai 
versus Hong Kong as a location for regional headquarters in the future according to 
numerous criteria that were broadly similar to those presented in Table 2. The results 
are summarised in Table 8. The overall conclusion was that Hong Kong was rated a 
significantly more attractive location for a regional headquarters than Shanghai. 
Shanghai’s sole advantage related to the costs of doing business such as cheaper 
office rental fees. The only other criteria that Shanghai came close to matching Hong 
Kong was related to its centrality to important markets. According to Table 8, 
Shanghai continues to lag significantly in areas relating to infrastructure, human 
capital, liveability and the broader category of political and economic freedom and the 
rule of law.  
Table 8 
There are numerous other summary measures that lend credence to the above 
conclusions. Apart from compiling a Macroeconomic Environment Index, the World 
Economic Forum also formulates a Business Competitiveness Index (Table 9, column 
1) that attempts to quantify the degree of company sophistication and the quality of 
the business environment in a given country. Another source that relates to political 
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and economic freedom is the Heritage Council’s Index of Economic Freedom. (Table 
9, column 2). This index ranks economic freedom according to ten factors including 
trade policy, fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary policy, foreign 
investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation and the 
black market, with 1 being “free” and 5 being “repressed”. The Fraser Institute’s 
publication Economic Freedom of the World (Table 9, column 3) similarly compiles 
data relating to the size of the government, legal structure and security of property 
rights, access to sound monetary policy, freedom to exchange with foreigners and 
regulation of credit, labour and business. Transparency International’s well-known 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Table 9, column 4) is also worth mentioning in this 
discussion. This index asks business leaders and country analysts to rate countries in 
terms of their perceptions regarding the prevalence of corruption with 10 being 
“highly clean” and 0 being “highly corrupted”. China’s performance in these indices 
is presented in Table 9, along with the comparative data relating to Hong Kong and 
Singapore.  
Table 9 
In all of the above indices, two points are notable. Firstly, China lags both Hong Kong 
and Singapore significantly. Secondly, both Hong Kong and Singapore perform not 
only well in relation to Shanghai but are also amongst the best performers 
internationally. Of course it needs to be recognised that the use of such national 
average scores is likely to bias the results against Shanghai because it is one of 
China’s more progressive cities. For example, according to the 2000 Marketization 
Index of China’s Provinces published by National Economic Research Institute in 
Beijing, Shanghai ranked 6th in terms of its progress towards achieving a free market 
economy (Fang et al. 2000). Nevertheless, in comparative terms, Guangdong 
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province, the number one ranking province, leads Shanghai by some 25% and there is 
little doubt that Hong Kong and Singapore would receive a higher ranking than 
Guangdong.  
 
Apart from summary measures, it is also useful to consider more disaggregated 
microeconomic data relating to factors such as physical infrastructure and human 
capital. This paper makes a contribution towards this endeavour in the form of Table 
10 and Table 11. Table 10 compares various aspects of the communications and 
transportation infrastructure in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore. On balance, 
while the data do suggest that Shanghai continues to lag Hong Kong and Singapore in 
many areas through 2002, the physical infrastructure gap is closing rapidly. For 
example, per capita telephony and Internet usage figures appear to be converging.  
Table 11 compares the number of students enrolled in law, business, economics and 
management in the three economies. Shanghai has much higher enrolment figures 
both in absolute and per-capita terms. Such flow figures suggest that the stock of 
human capital in Shanghai, like the physical capital stock, is rapidly improving. It 
should be noted however that enrolment figures do not shed direct light on current 
human capital stock differences, nor on any possible qualitative differences in 
education between the three economies. Furthermore, as a significant proportion of 
financial sector labour is highly mobile between countries, it is possible that foreign 
skilled workers can to some extent substitute for domestic supply shortages. Suffice to 
say that according to two surveys done by Tuan and Ng (2002) in Hong Kong and 
Shanghai over 2001 and 2002, company managers or high rank administrators regard 
Hong Kong having better human capital overall, albeit lagging behind Shanghai in 
individual aspects. 
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3.3 Financial market efficiency 
The efficiency of Shanghai’s stock market has been the subject of numerous studies. 
On balance, the evidence suggests that for much of its short history the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange has not been efficient, at least to the extent that stock prices and 
returns have not behaved in the random walk manner implied by the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (Song et al. 1998; Su and Fleisher 1998; Mookerjee and Yu 1999; Liu 
2003). Inefficiency in Shanghai’s stock markets can be explained by several factors. 
First, and in clear contrast with Hong Kong and Singapore, the state is the major 
player in Shanghai’s stock market. The majority of the shares of companies listed on 
Shanghai’s stock market are state-owned and not freely tradeable. When only a small 
proportion of a company's total shares are available for trading, share prices cannot 
reflect the market's view of the fundamental value of a listed firm (Spencer 1995, 
p.30; Yao 1998, p.22). The negative implications of non-tradeable state-owned shares 
for corporate governance and the financial performance of listed companies have also 
already been discussed at length in the literature (Tam 1999). Second, there is 
evidence that equity-trading costs in Shanghai are higher than in other stock 
exchanges, including those in Hong Kong and Singapore. Explicit costs of trading in 
Shanghai’s stock market, such as taxes and stamp duties, remain significant although 
they have been falling in recent years. After a reduction in November 2001, stamp 
duty levied on A- and B-share trading is currently fixed at 0.4 per cent, shared equally 
between the buyer and the seller (source: Hong Kong Stock Exchange). The 
comparative rate in Hong Kong is 0.225 per cent and in Singapore 0.2 per cent. The 
global trend is towards the abolition of such taxes with the U.S., Japan and Australia, 
amongst others, having already undertaken such action. It was also only recently that 
brokerage fees in Shanghai were no longer completely determined by the government. 
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Until May 2002 brokerage fees in Shanghai were administratively fixed at 0.35 per 
cent. After this date, brokerage fees became flexible up to a maximum of 0.3 per cent 
(People's Daily 05/04/2002). Hong Kong and Singapore have also been relatively 
slow in a global perspective in this respect. Singapore liberalized its brokerage 
commissions as of October 2000 while Hong Kong’s broking commissions were not 
deregulated until April 2002. Third, there is little doubt that the regulatory framework 
governing the trading of shares in Shanghai, along with the corporate governance 
standards of the listed companies themselves, lags international standards. For 
example, in measuring the pervasiveness of insider trading, the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2002-2003 ranked China the 70th amongst the 80 surveyed 
countries, with a score of 3.5 on a 1-7 scale (1 = pervasive, 7 = extremely rare). In 
comparison, Singapore ranked 8th with a score of 5.5 and Hong Kong ranked 35th with 
a score of 4.4. Fourth, the governance structure of Shanghai’s stock exchange 
continues to be traditional in the sense that it is based on a non-profit, cooperative 
model. Meanwhile, the global trend is towards demutualisation, with controlling 
companies in Hong Kong and Singapore, amongst others, even listing themselves on 
the domestic exchange. The benefits of demutualisation are several and have been 
summarised by Wei (2002). Finally, Shanghai’s equity markets continue to be 
segmented with respect to domestic and foreign participants. 
 
Inefficiencies in China’s credit market have already been well documented and so 
only need to be briefly mentioned here. Lardy (1998, p.76-127) provides a detailed 
description of how the financial performance of China’s major banks and the 
corporate governance structures surrounding them lag well behind international 
standards. Interestingly however, recent official data indicate that banks located in 
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Shanghai have performed far better than national average figures. For example, 
nationally state banks in 2002 had non-performing loans (NPLs) worth around 25 per 
cent of total outstanding loans (People's Daily 02/06/2002). Meanwhile, the People’s 
Bank of China Shanghai branch reported that state banks in Shanghai had an NPL 
ratio of just 8.14 per cent at year-end 2002. The average NPL ratio of all banks in 
Shanghai stood at 6.81 per cent (People's Daily 10/01/2003). This level is not far off 
comparative figures in Hong Kong and Singapore. The Banker (July 2003) magazine 
shows that at year-end 2002 NPLs in Hong Kong and Singapore’s largest commercial 
banks ranged from 2.42 per cent – 9.0 per cent respectively.  
 
The efficiency of Shanghai’s financial markets is also affected by a relative lack of 
diversity in terms of products and services offered. This is of course to be expected 
given Shanghai’s relatively short modern history of diversifying away from a bank-
based financial system to one that also includes markets for equity, commodities and 
risk. For example, stock futures and options are not traded in Shanghai in contrast 
with Hong Kong and Singapore.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Shanghai’s political leadership has set 10 to 20 years as the timeframe for achieving 
IFC status. Using the broader IFC literature as a conceptual framework, this paper 
reviewed Shanghai’s progress towards achieving this goal to date. A number of 
important findings emerge. Shanghai’s apparent strengths include its macroeconomic 
environment, in particular, its high rate of growth and international orientation. 
Strategic access to important markets, rapidly improving physical and human capital 
stocks and relatively cheap business input costs are also points of strength and it has 
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been the combination of these factors that has been driving its rapid development over 
the past decade, albeit growing from a small base. Furthermore, all recent indications 
point to China’s WTO entry being a boon for Shanghai. 
 
Equally important, however, is that the findings revealed numerous factors that make 
Shanghai’s transition to an IFC a problematic one. Most microeconomic factors 
important to the formation of an IFC continue to be areas of comparative weaknesses. 
These include perceptions relating to the relative lack of political and economic 
freedom and shortcomings in the rule of law.  Such issues largely reflect the fact that 
Shanghai is part of the mainland and as such is ultimately controlled by Beijing. 
Despite Shanghai being one of China’s most progressive cities, it will continue to be 
hampered by “national average” evaluations and a high intrinsic locational risk 
compared with other IFCs such as Hong Kong and Singapore. This means that 
statements by Shanghai’s political leadership regarding timeframes are ultimately 
misplaced because they do not have the decision-making authority to effect even the 
most basic changes necessary, such as full RMB convertibility. Thus, Shanghai’s 
greatest challenge is to secure the consensus and commitment of policy makers in 
Beijing. Achieving this consensus will not be easy given that Beijing has a range of 
competing interests at stake, not least of which include ensuring the stability of the 
domestic financial system and the RMB, and maintaining the prosperity of Hong 
Kong as a showcase of its one-country, two-systems policy.  
 
In terms of implications for Hong Kong and Singapore, the findings of this paper 
indicate that Shanghai will not be in a position to challenge their pre-eminence in the 
foreseeable future. Also of note is that the findings indicate that the strengths of Hong 
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Kong and Singapore appear to cut across the whole range of macroeconomic, 
microeconomic and financial market efficiency factors that are important to a city 
functioning as an IFC.  Thus, their long-term viability as IFCs appears credible, even 
if Shanghai is able to address the factors that currently constrain it. Singapore in 
particular benefits from the fact that its geographical location vis-à-vis Shanghai 
means that it will always hold a locational advantage in terms of meeting the financial 
needs of South-East Asia. Shanghai’s potential emergence as an IFC in the long term 
also need not necessarily represent a zero-game for Hong Kong given that it is in an 
ideal position to link with Shenzhen and service southern China, while also providing 
the high value added consulting services that Shanghai will require. While Shanghai 
is likely to continue to attract a steady stream of MNCs away from Hong Kong and 
Singapore in the coming years, ultimately Shanghai’s emergence need not come 
predominantly at their cost. There is already some evidence to support this conclusion 
in the Hong Kong government (2002) report cited earlier which showed that the 
number of foreign companies setting up regional headquarters in the autonomous 
region continued to increase through 2002, despite the rising prominence of Shanghai 
in recent years. Thus, it may well be that an Asian region which features a large and 
dynamic China can accommodate three fully-fledged IFCs.  
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Table 1. Types of Financial Markets 
Type 1(D Ö D) Intermediaries between domestic providers of capital and 
domestic users of capital. 
Type 2 (F Ö D) Intermediaries between foreign providers of capital and domestic 
users of capital. 
Type 3 (D Ö F) Intermediaries between domestic providers of capital and foreign 
users of capital. 
Type 4 (F Ö F) Intermediaries between foreign providers of capital and foreign 
users of capital. 
Source: Montes (1999, p.154) 
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Table 2. Factors influencing IFC development 
 
a. Macroeconomic 
environment 
 
• High GDP per capita and growth 
• High trade and investment intensity  
• Sound macroeconomic policy 
 
 
b. Microeconomic 
business 
environment 
 
• Low business costs (office rental, corporate taxes, 
wages, etc) 
• Significant domestic market and growth potential 
• Rule of law and the absence of corruption and red tape  
• Highly developed physical infrastructure 
(communications, transportation, etc) 
• Adequate human capital (availability of finance, 
accounting and legal professionals, etc) 
• Liveability (low pollution, affordable housing, access 
to high quality health, education, entertainment and 
cultural events) 
• Political and economic freedom 
 
 
c. Financial market 
efficiency 
 
• Low transaction costs (taxes, brokerage fees, etc) 
• International standards of accounting, legal and 
supervisory practices 
• Large variety of financial products and services 
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Table 3. Foreign Investment in Shanghai 
Year FDI (USD10,000) Number of registered firms with foreign capital 
1985 10754 (5.50)  
1990 17401 (4.99)  
1992 49361 (4.37) 3635 (4.31) 
1995 289261 (7.65) 14487 (6.20) 
2000 316014 (7.76) 15930 (7.83) 
2001 
2002 
429159 (9.15) 
427229 (8.14) 
18160 (8.98) 
20963 (10.07) 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years.  
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Table 4. GDP Growth in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore 
Shanghai Hong Kong Singapore  
2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 
Real GDP Growth (%) 10.2 10.7 0.5 2.3 –2.4 2.2 
Per Capita GDP 
(USD) 4,500 4,909 25,400 24,011 20,544 20,887 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistic Department; Singapore Department of Statistics; National 
Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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Table 5. International Trade Intensity [a] 
Import/ GDP Export/GDP Total Trade/ GDP  
1994– 
1996 
1997– 
1999 
2000– 
2002 
1994– 
1996 
1997– 
1999 
2000– 
2002 
1994– 
1996 
1997– 
1999 
2000– 
2002 
Shanghai 0.40 0.37 0.57 0.39 0.37 0.47 0.79 0.75 1.05 
Hong Kong 1.42 1.28 1.41 1.41 1.29 1.47 2.82 2.57 2.88 
Singapore 1.43 1.35 1.46 1.36 1.35 1.39 2.79 2.70 2.85 
[a] The figures for Shanghai cover only trade in merchandise goods, while those for Hong Kong and 
Singapore cover both goods and services. 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook; Yearbook of Statistics Singapore; Hong Kong data are from the 
World Development Indicators database. 
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Table 6. International Investment Intensity [a] [b] 
FDI Inflow/ GDP FDI Outflow/GDP Total FDI Flow/ GDP  
1990– 
1995 
1996– 
1998 
1999– 
2002 
1990– 
1995 
1996– 
1998 
1999– 
2002 
1990– 
1995 
1996– 
1998 
1999– 
2002 
Shanghai 0.113 0.143 0.122 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hong Kong 0.044 0.074 0.190 0.118 0.137 0.165 0.162 0.211 0.355 
Singapore 0.101 0.096 0.129 0.041 0.063 0.073 0.142 0.159 0.202 
[a] The figures are annual averages. 
[b] Foreign investment data for Shanghai are contracted values. Historically, actually utilised values are 
about two-thirds of the contracted values.  
Source: For Hong Kong and Singapore, 1990-95 figures are from World Investment Report 2002 
published by the UNCTAD; 1996-2001 figures are from International Financial Statistics published by 
the IMF. Figures for Shanghai are from Shanghai Statistical Yearbook. 
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Table 7. Macroeconomic Environment Index 
 Ranking [b] 
Index and subindex China Hong Kong Singapore 
Macroeconomic Environment (2002) [a] 8 3 1 
Macroeconomic Stability 5 9 1 
Country Credit Rating 32 25 18 
Government Expenditure 16 15 11 
Macroeconomic Environment (2001) 6 2 1 
Macroeconomic Stability 15 17 1 
Country Credit Rating 34 25 15 
Government Expenditure 4 7 20 
[a] Macroeconomic environment index = 1/2 macroeconomic stability subindex + 1/4 Institutional 
Investor country credit rating in March 2002 + 1/4 government expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 
2001. Macroeconomic stability subindex = 2/7 macroeconomic stability survey data + 5/7 
macroeconomic stability hard data. Survey data are based on the responses to two survey questions: (i) 
Is your country’s economy likely to be in a recession next year?; (ii) Has obtaining credit for your 
company become easier or more difficult over the past year? Hard data include: government 
surplus/deficit in 2001, national saving rate in 2001, inflation in 2001, real exchange rate relative to the 
U.S. in 2001, and lending-borrowing interest rate spread in 2001. 
[b] 80 and 75 countries were ranked in 2002 and 2001, respectively. 
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report, various issues. Information about the report can be 
obtained from the World Economic Forum’s website: http://www.weforum.org/. 
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Table 8. Attractiveness of Hong Kong versus Shanghai for Regional 
Headquarters [a] 
 
 Hong Kong (mean) Shanghai (mean) 
Centrality to important markets 4.2 3.7 
High quality local managers 4.2 2.8 
Financial services 4.4 2.8 
Supporting and supply industries 3.6 2.9 
Transportation infrastructure 4.2 2.9 
Communications infrastructure 4.4 3.0 
Technological environment 3.9 2.8 
Cost of doing business 2.4 2.9 
Government economic policy 3.4 2.5 
Political cleanliness 3.2 2.2 
Rule of law 3.4 2.3 
Quality of life for executives 3.8 2.5 
Overall attractiveness for RHQs 4.0 2.8 
 
[a] Respondents were asked to rank according to the following scores: 1 = very important; 2 = slightly 
unimportant; 3 = neutral; 4 = slightly unimportant; 5 = very important. 
Source: Michael Enright and Edmund Thompson (1998), cited in Wong (2002).  
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Table 9. Indices relating to the Microeconomic Business Environment 
 WEF [a] HC [b] FI [c] TI [d] 
 Rank Mean Rank Rank Mean Rank 
China 46 3.55 127 100 3.4 64 
Hong Kong 19 1.45 1 1 8.0 14 
Singapore 8 1.5 2 2 9.4 5 
[a] This data is taken from the 2003-2004 edition of the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report. This source compiled data relating to 100 countries. Information about this 
index can be obtained from the World Economic Forum’s website: http://www.weforum.org/ 
[b] This data is taken from the 2003 edition of the Heritage Council’s Index of Economic Freedom. 
This source compiled data relating to 161 countries. Information about the Index can be obtained from 
the Heritage Council’s website: http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/.  
[c] This data is taken from the 2003 edition of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom the World. This 
source compiled data relating to 123 countries. Information about the Index can be obtained from the 
Fraser Institute’s website: http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html. 
[d] This data is taken from the 2003 edition of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index. This source compiled data relating to 133 countries. Information about the Index can be 
obtained from the Transparency International’s website: ttp://www.transparency.org/cpi/index.html#cpi 
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Table 10. Communications and Transportation Infrastructure 
Year 2002 Shanghai Hong Kong Singapore 
Telephone lines & cellular subscribers (per 
capita) [a] 
1.19 1.49 1.24 
Internet users (per capita) 0.34 0.43 0.48 
Cargo handled (million tones)    
      Railway 58.36 0.385 N/A 
      Road 297.59 39.61 N/A 
      Sea 231.74 192 335.2 
      Air 1.32 2.48 1.64 
Port container throughput (million TEU) 8.61 18.65 16.94 
Post articles and parcels handled (billion) 2.81 1.27 1.59 
 
[a] Population figures for Shanghai and Hong Kong are year-end figures, while that for Singapore is 
mid-year. 
 
Source: Census & Statistics Department of Hong Kong; Yearbook of Statistics Singapore; Shanghai 
Statistical Yearbook. 
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Table 11. Human Capital 
Student enrolment (% of 
population) 
Shanghai [a] Hong Kong [b] Singapore [c] 
2001    
Law 15,207 (0.115) 1,274 (0.019) 3,205 (0.078) 
Business, economics and 
management 75,131 (0.566) 18,396 (0.276) 21,244 (0.514) 
2002    
Law 16,513 (0.124) 1,271 (0.019) 3,781 (0.076) 
Business, economics and 
management 95,316 (0.714) 17,585 (0.261) 21,020 (0.505) 
 
[a] For Shanghai, the figure covers higher education institutions, which include universities and 
colleges as well as colleges of postgraduates. There were 45 higher education institutions in 2001 and 
50 in 2002. The population size is an end-of-year figure. Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, 2003 
and 2002. 
[b] For Hong Kong, the figures include sub-degree, undergraduate, taught and research postgraduate. It 
covers the 6 universities and an institute of education. The population size is a mid-year figure. Source: 
Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 2001 and 2002. 
[c] For Singapore, the figures include polytechnic diploma and advanced diploma, university first and 
higher degrees. It covers 4 polytechnics and 4 universities. It includes legal studies offered in 
Polytechnic Diploma courses. It also includes accountancy. Source: Education figures are from the 
Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 2003; population figures are from the World Development Indicators 
database. 
 
 
 
